Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance by Veillette, Connie
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL32337
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) 
 and Related Funding Programs:
 FY2005 Assistance
Updated December 9, 2004
Connie Veillette
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related
Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance
Summary
In 2004, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean region
and drug trafficking.  The Administration requested $731 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative for FY2005, and $114 million for economic assistance
programs.  Congress also changed the level of U.S. military and civilian contractor
personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response to an Administration
request.  Congress continues to express concern with the volume of drugs readily
available in the United States and elsewhere in the world.  The three largest
producers of cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, with 90% of the cocaine in the
United States originating in, or passing through, Colombia.  Regional security issues
have also come into sharper focus after the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material
support to help Colombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the
development of Plan Colombia in 1999.  Congress passed legislation providing $1.3
billion in assistance for FY2000 (P.L. 106-246) for Colombia and its neighbors.
From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided a total of about $5.4
billion for the region in both State Department and Defense Department
counternarcotics funds.  Congress appropriated $731 million in FY2005 funds for the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative, with an additional $106.5 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) funds.  The United States also provides funding for Development
Assistance, Child Survival and Health, and Economic Support Funds.  In FY2004,
this economic assistance was estimated to be $123.6 million for ACI countries.
Since 2002, Congress has granted expanded authority to use counternarcotics funds
for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in
Colombia.  Three illegally armed groups in Colombia participate in drug production
and trafficking, and have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State
Department.
In the first session of the 108th Congress, the House passed and the Senate
considered the FY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 1950/S. 925) with
provisions relating to Colombia and drug interdiction programs in the Andean region.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out the FY2004 Foreign
Assistance Authorization Act (S. 1161/S.Rept. 108-56) with several modifications
on assistance to ACI countries. Neither of these bills received final approval. On
March 4, 2004, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 2144, the
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.  It includes several
provisions relating to Colombia and the Andean region that are similar to language
contained in S. 925.  The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200,
H.Rept. 108-767) was passed on October 9, 2004 and included provisions relating
to the Andean region, including raising the statutory caps on U.S. personnel assigned
in Colombia.  
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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1 This report on 2004 congressional action draws from CRS Report RL32021, Andean
Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and
Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Connie Veillette.  For earlier action, see CRS Report
RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance
for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino.
2 The U.S. program to provide anti-narcotics assistance to Colombia and the Andean region
was called the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) from 2001 to 2003.  ARI encompassed the
previous Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) as well as other assistance programs such as
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Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and
Related Funding Programs:
FY2005 Assistance
In 2004, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, the U.S. assistance program to help Colombia address drug
trafficking and economic development issues.1  These issues included ongoing
concerns with the effectiveness of the program, funding levels, human rights, and the
role and number of U.S. military and contract personnel.  The region has been viewed
as important primarily because it produces virtually all of the world’s cocaine and
increasing amounts of high quality heroin.  It is estimated that 90% of the cocaine
coming to the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia.  Moreover,
the stability of Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia’s longstanding
guerrilla insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are both believed to be
largely funded by their participation in illegal narcotics production and trafficking.
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative is the primary U.S. program that supports
Plan Colombia, a six year plan developed by President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002)
of Colombia, and continued by current President Alvaro Uribe.  While ACI is the
primary program, it is not the only one supporting counternarcotics and economic
development in the Andean region.  Countries in the region also receive Foreign
Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET),
Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic
Support Fund (ESF).  The Department of Defense also supports drug interdiction
operations from its own counternarcotics account.
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative
 U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, when Congress passed
legislation providing $1.3 billion in interdiction and development assistance (P.L.
106-246) for Colombia and six regional neighbors.2  Funding for ACI from FY2000
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Development Assistance, Child Survival and Health, Economic Support Funds, and Foreign
Military Financing.  For FY2004, the budget request returned to the usage of Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, with other funding that previously was part of the ARI, requested
from their regular accounts.
3 Panama and Brazil are  not considered Andean countries, but are included in ACI because
they each share borders with Colombia.  Bolivia is an Andean country but does not share
a border with Colombia.
through FY2004 totals $3.5 billion.  For FY2005, Congress appropriated an
additional $731 million. ACI is managed by the State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE). The
objectives are to eliminate the cultivation and production of cocaine and opium, build
Andean law enforcement infrastructure, arrest and prosecute traffickers, and seize
their assets.  The countries considered a part of the ACI include Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela3, with most funding allocated for
programs in Colombia.  Funds are divided between programs that support eradication
and interdiction efforts, as well as those focused on alternative crop development and
democratic institution building.  On the interdiction side, programs train and support
national police and military forces, provide communications and intelligence
systems, support the maintenance and operations of host country aerial eradication
aircraft, and improve infrastructure related to counternarcotics activities.  On the
alternative development side, funds support development programs in coca growing
areas, including infrastructure development, and marketing and technical support for
alternative crops.  It also includes assisting internally displaced persons, promoting
the rule of law, and expanding judicial capabilities.  
INCLE also manages the Interregional Aviation Support program, referred to
as the Air Wing, that operates a fleet of 164 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft
supporting overflight drug crop imagery and aerial eradication programs in
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.  FY2004 funding is estimated at $70 million, of which
approximately $45 million was allocated for programs in the Andean region.  The
request for FY2005 maintains funding at $70 million, of which approximately $50
million is proposed for Colombia.  ACI also funds the Air Bridge Denial Program
that is currently operational in Colombia, and temporarily suspended in Peru, after
an accidental shooting down of a civilian aircraft carrying U.S. missionaries in 2001.
After the incident, in which two Americans died, the program in both countries was
suspended until enhanced safeguards were developed.  The program in Colombia
resumed in August 2003. The program supports an aircraft fleet, pilot training, and
logistical and intelligence support.  The program tracks aircraft suspected of being
involved in drug trafficking, and forces them to land for inspection.  If the aircraft is
repeatedly unresponsive, it may be shot down, at the direction of the commander of
the Colombian Air Force.  The resumption of a program in Peru is still pending the
development of safety enhancements.  The FY2005 request was for $21 million, and
Congress approved $11.2 million.
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Related Funding Programs
Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) program and the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program, both managed by the State Department.  The Defense
Department has a counternarcotics account for worldwide programs involving
interdiction, training, equipment, and intelligence sharing.  In the Western
Hemisphere, these programs are managed by the U.S. Army Southern Command.
Foreign Military Financing.  Foreign Military Financing provides funding
grants to foreign nations to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.
The program’s objectives are to assist key allies to improve their defense capabilities,
to strengthen military relationships between the United States and FMF recipients,
and to promote the professionalism of military forces in friendly countries.  The
majority of FMF funding goes to countries in the Middle East, including Israel,
Egypt, and Jordan.  In the Western Hemisphere, a large portion of FMF is allocated
for Colombia and the Andean region with the objective of supporting the efforts of
those nations to establish and strengthen national authority in remote areas that have
been used by leftist guerrilla organizations, rightist paramilitaries, and narcotics
traffickers.  A portion of FMF funding in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 went for
infrastructure protection of oil pipelines in Colombia.  In FY2004, FMF funding for
the Andean region totaled $124.1 million, of which Colombia was allocated $109.4
million.  The FY2005 request was for $115.5 million, with $108 million for
Colombia.  Congress approved $106.5 million for the region, with $100 million for
Colombia.
International Military Education and Training.  The IMET program
provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.  Its
objectives are to improve defense capabilities, develop professional and personal
relationships between U.S. and foreign militaries, and influence these forces in
support of democratic governance.  Training focuses on the manner in which military
organizations function under civilian control, civil-military relations, military justice
systems, military doctrine, strategic planning, and operational procedures.  IMET
funding for the Andean region is estimated at $4.45  million in FY2004 out of a total
of $14.8 million for all of Latin America.  The request for FY2005 for the Andean
countries is $3.8 million. 
Department of Defense Counternarcotics Account.  The Department
of Defense has authority for counternarcotics detection and monitoring under
Sections 124, 1004, and 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act.  DOD
requests a lump sum for counternarcotics programs worldwide and does not request
amounts by country.  The estimated amount for Colombia in FY2004 ranges from
$122 million to $160 million.  The request for FY2005 DOD counternarcotics
funding for Latin America is $366.9 million, of which up to $200 million is planned
for Colombia.  Activities include detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S.
law enforcement agencies interdict drug trafficking.  In the Andean region, support
is provided in the form of training, equipment, and intelligence sharing activities.
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Economic Assistance Programs
Economic assistance programs for the Andean region are not considered part of
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, although they support many programs which are
tangentially related, such as poverty reduction.  From 2001 to 2003, Development
Assistance, Child Survival and Health, and Economic Support Fund programs were
requested as part of the President’s Andean Regional Initiative.  Development
Assistance (DA) seeks to foster sustainable economic growth with a focus on trade
and investment, agriculture, education, environment, health, and democracy.  The
ACI region is estimated to receive $47.8 million in FY2004 from a total of $244.8
million for Latin America.  The request for FY2005 totals $44.3 million out of
$241.7 million for Latin America.  Child Survival and Health (CSH) focuses on
treating infectious disease, promoting child and maternal health, family planning, and
reproductive health.  Countries in the Andean region are estimated to receive $$43.4
million in FY2004 out of $148.6 million allocated for Latin America.  The requested
amount for FY2005 for the hemisphere is $130.3 million, from which $37.2 million
is proposed for the ACI region.  The Economic Support Fund (ESF) program funds
initiatives aimed at creating employment and promoting conditions that support
international investment and trade.  In Latin America, ESF is focused on promoting
stable democracies, secure borders, anti-corruption, trade-led growth, and
counternarcotics.  The ACI region is estimated to receive $32.4 million in FY2004
and Congress earmarked $36 million in FY2005.  ESF funding for all of Latin
America is $84.5 million in FY2004 and a proposed $92 million in FY2005.
Congressional Conditions on U.S. Assistance
Since first approving expanded assistance to Colombia for counternarcotics
programs in 2000, Congress has included a number of conditions on U.S. assistance
in both authorization and appropriations legislation.  The most recently enacted
funding legislation is the FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Division
D of H.R. 4818, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law as
P.L. 108-447 December 8, 2004), which included a number of longstanding
provisions relating to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.  The FY2005 Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 4200/H.Rept. 108-767) also includes provisions relating to
Colombia.  The following are provisions of current law as provided in H.R. 4818,
Division D and the Defense Authorization Act.
Expanded Authority.  Current law maintains language, first approved by
Congress in 2002, authorizing support for a unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking and activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations.
Report language notes that counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial
reform should remain the principal focus of U.S. policy in Colombia. This authority
shall cease if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed
Forces are not vigorously attempting to restore government authority and respect for
human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla
organizations.
Personnel Caps.  The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
4200, Conf. Rept. 108-767, sent to the White House on October 21, 2004) changes
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current law with regard to the cap on the number of U.S. military and U.S. civilian
contractors that can be deployed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia.  The cap
on military personnel was raised from 400 to 800, and for civilian contractors, from
400 to 600. The cap does not apply to personnel conducting search and rescue
operations, nor to U.S. personnel assigned as part of their regular duties to the U.S.
Embassy.  As of late November 2003, there were 278 temporary and permanent U.S.
military personnel and 373 U.S. citizen civilian contractors in Colombia in support
of Plan Colombia.  These numbers vary as programs are begun, expanded, or
completed.  During 2003, they have varied between 208 and 396 military personnel,
and 247 to 400 civilian contractors.  The personnel caps also do not apply to foreign
national contract employees. 
Helicopters.  Current law maintains language requiring that if any helicopter
procured with ACI funds is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-
defense group or illegal security cooperative, the helicopter shall be immediately
returned to the United States.
Reports.  Current law requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Administrator of USAID, provide to the Committees on Appropriations a report
within 45 days of enactment and prior to the initial obligation of funds on the
proposed uses of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed
program, project, or activity.
Human Rights.  Current law allows the obligation of 75% of assistance to the
Colombian Armed Forces without a determination and certification from the
Secretary of State regarding respect for human rights and severing ties with
paramilitary groups.  The remaining 25% can be released in two installments of
12.5% each.  The first installment can be made provided that the Secretary of State
certifies that (1) the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is
suspending members who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross
violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; (2)
the Colombian government is vigorously investigating and prosecuting members of
the military who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of
human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; (3) the
Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases; (4) the Colombian Armed
Forces have made substantial progress in severing links to paramilitary organizations;
and 5) the Colombian Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitary leadership and
financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers.  The last
installment can be made after July 31, 2004, if the Secretary of State certifies that the
Colombian Armed Forces are continuing to meet the above conditions and are
conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for
human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla
organizations.  It also requires that not later than 60 days after enactment, and every
90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with internationally recognized
human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting these conditions.  It denies
visas to anyone who the Secretary of State determines willfully provided any support
to leftist guerrilla organizations or rightist paramilitaries, or has participated in the
commission of gross violations of human rights in Colombia.
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In addition to these provisions that are specific to Colombia, the act includes a
provision from previous legislation, often called the Leahy amendment, that denies
funds to any unit of a security force for which the Secretary of State has credible
evidence of gross human rights violations.  The Secretary may continue funding if
he determines and reports to Congress that the foreign government is taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of these security forces to justice.
Earmarks.  Current law designates that, for FY2005 funding, not less than
$264.6 million of ACI funds be made available for alternative development and
institution building, of which $237 million shall be allocated to USAID.  Of this
latter amount, USAID is directed to use $125.7 million for programs in Colombia.
It requires that not less than $6 million be made available for judicial reform
programs in Colombia and not less than $6 million for programs to protect human
rights.  It also earmarks not less than $2 million for programs to protect biodiversity
and indigenous reserves in Colombia. 
Aerial Fumigation.  Current law requires that not more than 20% of funds
used for the procurement of chemicals for aerial coca and poppy fumigation be made
available unless the Secretary of State certifies that 1) the herbicide mixture is in
accordance with EPA label requirements for comparable use in the United States and
any additional controls recommended by the EPA; and 2) the herbicide mixture does
not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment.
Further, the Secretary of State must certify that complaints of harm to health or licit
crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is being paid for
meritorious claims.  These funds may not be made available unless programs are
being implemented by USAID, the Colombian government, or other organizations,
and in consultation with local communities, to provide alternative sources of income
in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers whose illicit crops are
targeted for fumigation.
Prohibition on Combat.  Current law continues the prohibition on U.S.
military personnel or U.S. civilian contractors participating in any combat operations
in Colombia.  This provision has been included in authorization and appropriation
legislation since the original Plan Colombia law approved by Congress in 2000.
Air Bridge Denial Program.  In order to resume U.S. support for  a Peruvian
air interdiction program, the Secretary of State and the Director of Central
Intelligence must certify to Congress 30 days prior to resuming the program that
enhanced safeguards and procedures have been developed.
Bolivia.  It allows assistance to the Bolivian military and police forces only if
they are respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations and
prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights.
Colombian Demobilization.  Current law requires congressional
consultation and notification prior to USAID obligating any funds for peace
initiatives in Colombia.  The conference agreement expressed concern that the
demobilization process is not ensuring the dismantling of FTOs or deterring members
from resuming illegal activities and that the government of Colombia is not
prosecuting those involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations.  It further
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recommends that the State Department not request FY2006 funds for demobilization
unless the Department of Justice determines the activities are consistent with U.S.
anti-terrorism laws and that 
1) the FTO is respecting a ceasefire and cessation of illegal activities; 
2) the Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its
obligations under the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and has committed to the
U.S. that it will continue to extradite Colombians, including members of illegally
armed groups; 
3) the Colombian legal framework governing demobilization provides for
prosecution and punishment in proportion to the crimes committed of those
responsible for gross violations of human rights, violations of international
humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, as well as providing for reparations of
victims and the monitoring of demobilized individuals; 
4) the Colombian government is implementing a policy of dismantling such groups,
including seizure of financial and property assets; and 
5) the Colombian government is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets,
including real property, to their original owners.
The conference report also requests that before any U.S. funds are provided to
the OAS Mission in Colombia for demobilization purposes, the Secretary of State
report to the Committees on Appropriations that the OAS Mission is strictly adhering
to its verification role, that FTOs are concentrated in demobilization zones, that the
legal framework governing demobilization conforms with (3) above, and that the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights is providing advice to the OAS
Mission.
Administration FY2005 Request
ACI Request.  On February 2, 2004, President Bush submitted his budget
request for Fiscal Year 2005.  The Administration proposed spending $731 million
for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the same amount it requested for FY2004.
Part of this amount, $21 million, is designated for the Air Bridge Denial Program,
which would continue contractor logistical support and training for programs in both
Peru and Colombia.
Colombia.  The single largest amount, $463 million, is designated for
Colombia.  Of this amount, $313 million is proposed for drug interdiction efforts,
and $150 million for alternative development and institution building programs.
Contending that this year marks a “tipping point” in the program, the Administration
maintains that the objectives of FY2005 funding are to support drug interdiction and
eradication efforts of the Colombian National Police and the Army, for infrastructure
improvements, police training, and secure and interoperable communications and
intelligence systems.  ACI funds would be used to support 71 Colombian military
helicopters for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts.  Funding will also
support eight helicopters for infrastructure security in the province of Arauca.  On the
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development front, ACI funds will be used for strengthening a licit agricultural
economy, assisting groups that have been displaced because of the fighting, and
supporting programs that strengthen democracy and promote the rule of law, human
rights, and judicial reform.
Peru.  Peru is the second largest recipient of ACI funding with $112 proposed
for FY2005; $50 million for alternative development and institution building, and
$62 million for interdiction.  Interdiction funds are proposed for both the forced and
voluntary eradication of coca and poppy cultivation by providing training, advisors,
vehicles, aircraft maintenance, ground-based infrastructure, communications, and
support equipment.  Alternative development funds are designated for the building
of roads, bridges, potable water systems, electricity systems, irrigation systems, and
schools and health facilities.
Bolivia.  ACI funding for Bolivia is proposed at $91 million — $42 million for
alternative development and institution building programs, and $49 million
interdiction efforts.  Alternative development includes economic development in
coca growing areas, demand reduction education programs, and the expansion of
physical infrastructure.  Interdiction funding would provide operational support for
specialized counterdrug police and military units, and would improve data collection
for law enforcement activities.  The United States would also continue to provide
support for a U.S.-owned helicopter fleet, and to maintain and purchase vehicles,
riverine patrol boats, training and field equipment, and construct and refurbish
antiquated counternarcotics bases.
Other Countries.  Ecuador is the next largest recipient of ACI funds, with $26
million proposed for FY2005 — $15 million for alternative development and
institution building, and $11 million for interdiction.  The objective of assistance to
Ecuador is to stop or prevent any spillover of drug trafficking and guerrilla activity
from Colombia, and to stop the transit of drugs destined for the United States.
Requested FY2005 ACI support in Brazil ($9 million), Panama ($6 million), and
Venezuela ($3 million) are also aimed at preventing spillovers from Colombia, and
to provide interdiction support.
FMF and IMET Request.  The FY2005 request for FMF for the Andean
region totals $115.5 million, with Colombia receiving the largest portion, $108
million.  Funding for FY2005 would be used to establish and strengthen national
authority in remote areas that are being used by illegally armed groups and are
cocaine producing areas.  Bolivia would receive $3 million, Ecuador $2 million,
Panama $1.5 million, and Peru $1 million to strengthen their capabilities to interdict
drug production and trafficking.  The FY2005 IMET request for the Andean region
is $3.8 million, of which $1.7 million is designated for Colombia.  The IMET
program focuses on civil-military issues for junior and mid-grade military officers.
Defense Department Counternarcotics Request.  The estimate for
FY2005 DOD counternarcotics funding for all of Latin America is $366.9 million.
Activities include detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S. law enforcement
agencies interdict drug trafficking.  In the Andean region, support is provided in the
form of training, equipment, and intelligence sharing activities.  A country-by-
country breakdown of DOD counternarcotics funds is not available.  However, in
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testimony before the House Government Reform Committee on March 2, 2004,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
Thomas W. O’Connell, reported that $200 million of the portion allocated for Latin
America would go “to support Andean Region initiatives, primarily in Colombia.”
Funding in previous years has averaged about $150 million per year.
Economic Assistance Request.  Peru and Bolivia are the primary
beneficiaries of Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds.  For
DA, Peru would receive $10.5 million and Bolivia $14.5 million in FY2005.  Brazil
and Ecuador would each receive $7 million, and Panama $5.4 million. For Child
Survival and Health, Peru would receive $13 million, Bolivia $16.1 million, Brazil
$7.6 million and Ecuador $351,000.  Economic Support Funds in FY2005 would be
divided between Bolivia ($8 million), Ecuador ($13 million), Panama ($3 million),
Peru ($8 million), and Venezuela ($500,000).
Assistance to Colombia and 
Neighboring Countries
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven
countries in the broadly defined Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.  The region is important to the United States because
it includes three major drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where
virtually all the world’s cocaine and significant quantities of high quality heroin
destined for the United States are produced.  It also includes two major oil producing
countries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which supply significant quantities of oil to the United
States.  While the seven countries have diverse trading relationships, the United
States is the major trading partner for all of them.  For the five traditional Andean
countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), the Andes mountain
range that runs through South America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and
inter-state integration, but the countries are linked together in the Andean
Community economic integration pact.  The ACI countries are some of the most
heavily populated in Latin America, including first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth
(Peru), sixth (Venezuela) and eighth (Ecuador) most populous.  Although Colombia
and Venezuela have largely European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations,
Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have significant indigenous populations.  (See appendices
at the end of this report for funding tables.)
Colombia4
Colombia’s spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by
three parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation
and processing, and contributes to the government’s difficulty in exerting control
throughout the nation.  The country is known for a long tradition of democracy, but
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also for continuing violence, including a guerrilla insurgency dating back to the
1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity.  Recent administrations have had to
deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist paramilitaries (or “self-
defense” forces), and independent drug trafficking cartels.  The two main leftist
guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN).  The rightist paramilitaries are coordinated by the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  All three groups participate in drug
production and trafficking, regularly kidnap individuals for ransom, and have been
accused of gross human rights abuses.  The three groups have been designated
foreign terrorist organizations by the United States.  The AUC and Colombian
military have been accused of collaborating in fighting the FARC and ELN.  There
are additional paramilitary groups that operate independently from the AUC.
U.S. Policy Debate.  Recent debate on U.S. policy toward Colombia has
taken place in a context of concern over the sheer volume of illegal drugs available
in the United States and elsewhere in the world, and security concerns that have come
into sharper focus after the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The U.S. policy debate
has focused on a number of related issues, such as the effectiveness and
implementation of the program in general, the nature of U.S. support to address what
many consider to be a purely civil conflict, and the socioeconomic factors that many
observers claim are the underlying cause of the continuing conflict.  
Because Plan Colombia was developed as a six year plan, Congress will most
likely review its progress in light of considerations of proposals to continue U.S.
assistance after 2005.  In addition to the basic debate over what role the United States
should play in Colombia’s struggle against drug trafficking and illegally armed
groups, Congress has repeatedly expressed concern with a number of related issues.
These include continuing allegations of human rights abuses; the expansion of U.S.
assistance for counterterrorism and infrastructure protection; the health and
environmental consequences of aerial fumigation for drug control; the progress of
alternative development to replace drug crops with non-drug crops; judicial reform
and rule of law programs; the level of risk to U.S. personnel in Colombia and the
continued captivity of several American hostages held by the FARC.  
In response to a request by the Administration and a report by the Council of
Foreign Relations that recommended increasing the number of U.S. military and
civilian personnel allowed to be deployed in support of Plan Colombia, the Senate
approved the Administration request to raise the statutory caps on military personnel
from 400 to 800, and on civilian contractors from 400 to 600 in the FY2005 National
Defense Authorization Act (S. 2400/S.Rept. 108-260.)5  The House-passed National
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200/H.Rept. 108-491) raised the military
personnel cap to 500 and maintained the civilian cap at 400.  The Conference Report
(108-767) was passed by both chambers on October 9, 2004, and sent to the White
House on October 21, 2004.  It raises the cap on military personnel to 800 and
civilian contractors to 600.
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Supporters of U.S. policy argue that Colombia is a beleaguered democratic ally
under siege by powerful armed forces of the left and right fueled by drug money.  In
the context of the global war on terrorism, and with the growing recognition of the
relationship between drug trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency, proponents argue
that Colombia and its neighbors should be supported with counternarcotics and
counterterrorism assistance before the situation deteriorates further.  They favor
expanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian
security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout
rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationale and support for paramilitary groups.
They also argue that guerrilla forces regularly cross borders using neighboring
countries’ territory for refuge and supplies, and that this has a potentially
destabilizing effect in the region.  The FARC and ELN have also claimed
responsibility for attacking infrastructure necessary for Colombia’s continued
economic development.  This is particularly important in oil exploration and
transport.  Colombia exported 256,000 barrels per day of crude to the United States
in 2002, which is approximately half of Colombia’s output.6 
Opponents of U.S. policy argue that  the counterdrug program uses a repressive
military approach to curbing drug production which could provoke a popular reaction
in rural areas.  They argue for halting aerial fumigation of drug crops and aid to the
Colombian military, believing that coca farmers cannot be expected to abandon coca
farming voluntarily until adequate economic alternatives are in place.  They fear that
forcing such farmers to give up coca growing will only drive many to the ranks of the
armed groups, or to become displaced persons dependent on the state.  Further, they
argue that any decreases in coca cultivation in Colombia will be offset by increases
in neighboring countries, as was witnessed in 2002 when reported acres of coca
cultivation in Peru and Bolivia increased.  Instead, many urge that counternarcotics
policy should stress interdiction rather than eradication so that the direct costs to
peasant producers would be less.  Some critics of U.S. policy would support a policy
that focuses largely on economic and social aid to combat what they consider to be
the conflict’s root causes, curbs the still rampant human rights abuses by paramilitary
groups, provides vigorous support for a negotiated end to the fighting, and
emphasizes illicit drug demand reduction in the United States.  Still others urge a
regional and multilateral approach, in which  drug consuming countries would fund
land reform and rural development programs, as complementary to interdiction
efforts.7
Uribe Administration.  Alvaro Uribe ran for the Colombian presidency as an
independent on a platform focusing on defeating the guerrilla insurgents, eliminating
the paramilitaries, and ending narcotics trafficking.  Upon taking office on August
7, 2002, he took a number of steps, some of which have proven to be controversial.8
He promulgated a decree invoking emergency powers, allowing security forces to
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make arrests without warrants and imposing controls on movements in war-torn parts
of the country.  Under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, states of emergency may be
declared for 90 days, and then can be renewed for two additional 90-day periods.
The country’s constitutional court has, on several occasions, ruled unconstitutional
components of the state of emergency that give security forces increased powers.  In
response, the Uribe Administration introduced legislation in April 2003, which the
Congress passed late in the year, that would change the Constitution in order to give
security forces permanent powers to tap phones and search homes without warrants
in all parts of the country.  At the end of 2004, the Colombian Congress passed
legislation amending the constitution allowing for the consecutive re-election of
presidents.  It is widely believed that Uribe will run for a second term.
President Uribe has taken a hard-line approach to negotiations, declaring that
the government would only negotiate with those groups who are willing to give up
terrorism and agree to a cease-fire, including paramilitary groups, with which former
President Pastrana had refused to negotiate. Uribe has increased the size of the
military and police, largely through a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals
and businesses, and created a “civilian informers” program.  With regard to ending
narcotics trafficking, President Uribe substantially increased resources for the aerial
fumigation program, vowing to spray all coca crops by the end of his term in 2006.
There are indications that this hard-line approach has produced measurable
results.  President Uribe announced at the end of 2003 that 4,294 members of armed
groups had deserted, an 80% increase over the previous year.  Police are being
redeployed to areas from which they had been previously ousted by guerrilla groups.
The homicide rate dropped 22%, and the rate of rural massacres dropped by 37%
from 2002.  The number of kidnappings fell by 32% over the same time period.  On
the economic front, private investment increased 17% and the economy grew by
3.3% in 2003.  Growth projections for 2004 are in the 3.5 to 4% range.9
AUC Demobilization and Amnesty Proposal.  On July 15, 2003, the
Uribe Administration announced an agreement with leaders of the AUC that would
result in the demobilization of its members by the end of 2005.  It is estimated that
as many as 5,000 fighters operate outside of the AUC, some of whom are negotiating
separately with the government, and others who are not participating at all.  The
Organization of American States established a Mission to Support the Peace Process
in Colombia in February 2004 to mediate the demobilization process. As par t  of
demobilization, President Uribe has proposed controversial legislation that would
grant conditional amnesties to illegal combatants, which means that it could also
apply to FARC and ELN fighters if they decide to enter into negotiations with the
government. The United States has designated the AUC a foreign terrorist
organization and has requested the extradition of two top AUC leaders, Carlos
Castaño and Salvador Mancuso, on five indictments of conspiracy to import cocaine
into the United States.  The State Department has confirmed that the United States
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will not drop its requests for the extradition of any Colombians under indictment in
the United States.
The Uribe Administration argues that without the inducement of amnesties, or
the possibility of paying reparations to victims instead of serving jail sentences,
paramilitary leaders and fighters will be unwilling to demobilize, and a spiral of
violence will continue in Colombia.  Critics of the proposal include Colombian
legislators, political commentators, and international human rights organizations.
They argue that AUC forces have been responsible for some of the worst violations
of human rights, including massacres of civilians, and that the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Colombia is party, requires that states will
ensure that violators are brought to justice.  Other critics argue that the paramilitaries
are not respecting the accord and are continuing military activities.  President Uribe’s
proposal would allow the president to determine which members of illegal armed
groups would qualify for suspended sentences.  Combatants who qualify would have
to agree to disarm and to demonstrate support for the peace process.  Combatants
would also agree to make reparations, of money or assets, to victims directly, or into
a government fund for victims.  The amnesty process requires that fighters appear
before a criminal court where crimes will be admitted and penalties imposed.
Fighters would be convicted of crimes and then alternative penalties to prison would
be determined by a judge.  In response to criticism, President Uribe submitted revised
legislation that requires minimum jail sentences of at least five years.  The proposal
is pending before the Colombian Congress.
Coca Cultivation and Eradication.  Upon taking office, President Uribe
announced that aerial eradication,10 along with alternative crop development, would
form a significant basis of the government’s efforts.  The Plan Colombia eradication
spraying program began in December 2000 with operations by the U.S. funded
counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo.  Despite early indications that coca cultivation
had increased by 25% in 2001, Colombian and U.S. officials reported decreases of
15% in 2002.  The United Nations, using a different method of survey and
calculation, estimated a 30% decrease over the same time period.  According to the
State Department, cultivation of opium poppy declined by 24% in 2002, and 10% in
2003.  Coca cultivation in 2003 declined by 21%, according to the State Department.
It is believed that the Plan Colombia goal of having sprayed 50% of the country’s
coca crop by the end of 2005 may have been accomplished two years ahead of
schedule.  It should be noted, however, that spraying does not prevent, although it
may discourage, the replanting of illicit crops.
Aerial fumigation has been controversial.  Critics charge that it has unknown
environmental and health effects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood,
particularly in light of a lack of coordination with alternative development programs.
Proponents argue that both eradication and alternative development programs need
time to work.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Agency, certified on December 15, 2003 that the chemicals used in spray
operations do not pose a risk to health or the environment.
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Funding and Request for Colombia.
! Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received
$832 million in State Department funds for assistance to the
Colombian police and military, economic and alternative
development assistance, aid for displaced persons, human rights,
administration of justice, and other governance programs.  In
addition, $300.6 million was appropriated to the Defense
Department to assist the Colombian military’s anti-drug efforts
through interdiction support and the training and equipment of
Colombian counternarcotics battalions.  This amount also included
support for Andean regional counternarcotics programs. 
! Under  ACI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $373.9
million, with $243.50 million in counternarcotics assistance, and
$137 million in economic and social programs.  
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, the Administration
requested $4 million of International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funding for police post support in areas of
weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding (which
Congress directed to be transferred to the INCLE account) for
counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding
for counter-kidnapping training.  The enacted legislation specifically
provided $6 million for infrastructure protection for the Cano-Limón
Coveñas oil pipeline, and fully funded the other accounts.
! For FY2003, Colombia received $526.2 million in ACI funding for
Colombia, including $377 million for narcotics interdiction and
eradication, $149.2 million for alternative development. The
FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental included an additional
$54 million in ACI and FMF funding bringing the total to $580.2
million.  In addition, $110.1 million in FMF funding was provided
to train and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil
pipeline in the country.  
! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending a total of $463
million for ACI, consisting of $150 million for alternative
development, and  $313 million for narcotics interdiction and
eradication programs.  The estimate for FMF is $109.4 million.
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $463 million in ACI
funding, consisting of $150 million for alternative development and
$313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication.  The request
for FMF was $108 million.  Congress approved $466.5 million in
ACI funding and $100 million for FMF.
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Peru
Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the second largest
cocaine producer in the world and exports high purity cocaine and cocaine base to
markets in South America, Mexico, Europe, and the United States.  Nevertheless, it
has been viewed as a success story in counternarcotics efforts because joint U.S.-Peru
air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication efforts, and alternative
development programs have significantly reduced coca production.  Facing mounting
protests, the Peruvian government temporarily suspended the drug eradication
program in the Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but resumed the program
in September 2002 once concerns were addressed, in part to be eligible for Andean
Trade Preference Act benefits.  The State Department reports that coca cultivation
had decreased in Peru by 15% in 2003, after an 8% increase in 2002.
Peru has worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia.
Responding to press reports that FARC forces had penetrated into Peruvian territory,
Peruvian officials stated in early 2002 that there are no permanent FARC forces in
Peru, but they conceded that they may cross temporarily into border areas.  Because
of these threats, Peru moved military bases from its border with traditional rival
Ecuador, where tensions have diminished, to the border with Colombia. President
Alejandro Toledo, inaugurated on July 28, 2001, has had to deal with many strikes
and protests, with his popularity reaching new lows in 2003. With regard to drugs,
Toledo labeled drug trafficking a national security problem for Peru, and established
a drug czar to better coordinate counternarcotics initiatives.  When President Bush
visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the two Presidents agreed to enhance cooperation
on counternarcotics and counterterrorism issues.  However, U.S. military aid to Peru
was suspended on July 1, 2003, because Peru has not signed an agreement exempting
U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which would
result in the loss of $2.7 million in assistance in FY2004, and $1.3 million in
FY2005.
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the
circumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a
Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary
woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the
small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities.  As a result of this
accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia was
suspended pending clarification of procedures.  The State Department released a
report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that
“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in
the accident.  Current law (P.L.108-199) requires the Secretary of State to notify
Congress 30 days prior to resuming U.S. support for the air interdiction program and
to provide assurances that greater safety enhancements are in place. 
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Funding and Request for Peru.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding, Peru received $25
million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police.  
! Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $142.5 million in
ACI funds, with $75 million in counternarcotics aid and $67.5
million for alternative development. No funds were requested for
Peru in the FY2002 supplemental.
! Under the ACI allocation  for FY2003, Peru received $128.1 million
in ACI funds, with $59.5 million in counternarcotics aid and $68.6
million for alternative development.  Peru received $1 million in
FMF funding.
! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $116 million in
ACI funds, with $66 million in counternarcotics aid and $50 million
for alternative development. Peru is to receive $1.7 million for FMF
funding.
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $112 million for ACI
funding, consisting of $62 million in counternarcotics aid, and $50
million for alternative development.  The request also included $1
million of FMF funding.  Congress approved $116.3 million in ACI
funding and $1 million for FMF.
Bolivia11
Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia’s significant
gains in reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in
controlling production in Colombia.  Once the world’s foremost producer of coca
leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducing coca cultivation under the Banzer-
Quiroga administration (1997-2002).12  However, forcible eradication of coca has
become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class and ethnicity
that may foment political instability in Latin America’s poorest country.  Moreover,
according to the State Department,  coca cultivation increased 23% in 2002 and 17%
in 2003.13  Nevertheless, Bolivia’s coca cultivation is still about half of its 1995
levels.  It should be noted that Bolivian law allows up to 12,000 hectares of coca
cultivation for traditional use. Bolivia has signed an article 98 agreement exempting
U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  In July 2003,
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and previous to an agreement being signed, the Bush Administration had waived the
withholding of U.S. military aid from the country.
For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on
controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to
Colombia to be processed into cocaine.  In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics
efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative
development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development
assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance.  Bolivia, like Peru, has
been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with joint air and riverine
interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and effective alternative
development programs reducing illegal coca cultivation to the lowest level in five
years, with a net reduction of approximately 70% between 1996 and 2001.  Others,
however, view the forced eradication as a social and political disaster that has fueled
popular discontent and increased the political support for opposition candidates. 
Current President Carlos Mesa took over the office upon the resignation of
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, of the National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR),  who was forced to step down in response to widespread public protests in
2003. The protests were the result of long simmering tensions over coca eradication
policies, the continuing economic marginalization of the poorer segments of society,
and a controversial government proposal to export natural gas via a port in Chile, an
historic adversary of Bolivia.  The new President faces many difficulties in governing
a politically fractured society, one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere, within
the context of a highly mobilized indigenous community led by Evo Morales who
finished a close second in the 2002 presidential elections.  Mesa also will be
challenged to obtain congressional approval of revisions to Bolivian law governing
the natural gas industry after a national referendum endorsed Mesa’s proposed
changes.
Funding and Request for Bolivia.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding, Bolivia received $25
million for regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in
alternative development assistance.  
! Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $81 million in
ACI funds, consisting of $48 million in drug interdiction and
eradication, and $33 million in alternative development, and
$500,000 in Foreign Military Financing. 
! Under the FY2003 ACI allocation, Bolivia received nearly $91
million in ACI funding, consisting of $49 million in interdiction and
eradication, and $41.7 million in alternative development.  In
addition, Bolivia  received $2 million in Foreign Military Financing.
! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $91 million in
ACI funds, consisting of $49 million for interdiction and eradication,
and $42 million in alternative development.  In addition, the
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Administration estimates spending $4 million in Foreign Military
Financing.
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $91 million in ACI
funding, consisting of $49 million for interdiction and eradication,
and $42 million for alternative development.  The request also
included $3 million in Foreign Military Financing.  Congress
approved $91 million for ACI and $2 million for FMF.
Ecuador14
On Colombia’s southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s
neighbors because it is situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombia that are
guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas.  As a major transit country for
cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru, Ecuador cooperates extensively with
the United States in counternarcotics efforts.  In November 1999, the United States
signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for a forward operating location (FOL) in
Manta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial counterdrug detection and monitoring
operations.  Although the agreement is solely for the detection of drug trafficking
flights in the region, some human rights groups and politicians in Ecuador fear that
the facility could be used to support operations against guerrillas in neighboring
Colombia.  Ecuador has not signed an agreement to exempt U.S. citizens from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and it became subject to U.S.
sanctions on July 1, 2003, with the possible loss of $15.7 million in FMF funding and
IMET education in FY2004, and $2.3 million in FY2005. 
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory
for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and FARC camps have been detected
in Ecuador’s northern province of Sucumbios, where it was reported that barracks,
ammunition, explosives and radio equipment were found.15  Ecuadoran officials say
they have uncovered and destroyed several small cocaine processing labs in the area.
The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a constant flow of Colombian refugees
into the poor areas, and fighters with Colombian paramilitary organizations have
been arrested for running extortion rings in Ecuadorian border regions.  Ecuador and
Colombia are cooperating with regard to border issues and improved
communications.  Ecuador has reinforced its northern border with Colombia as
Colombian anti-guerrilla operations intensified following the breakdown of the peace
talks in 2002, and increasing pressure on guerrilla forces by the Colombian military.16
President of Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez, has said that the armed conflict in Colombia
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is having an adverse affect on Ecuadoran peasants in border areas, and he has
claimed that the aerial fumigation in Colombia is harming the Ecuadoran
environment and negatively affecting Ecuadorans’ health.17 
Funding and Request for Ecuador.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding Ecuador received $20
million in U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support drug
interdiction efforts, and $8 million was for alternative development
assistance.  Another $61.3 million has been allocated for the
construction of a Forward Operating Location in Manta, Ecuador for
counternarcotics aerial surveillance. 
! Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $25 million in
ACI funding, consisting of $15 million in interdiction and law
enforcement programs, and $10 million in alternative development.
Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, Ecuador  received $3
million in FMF funding.
! Under the FY2003 ACI allocations, Ecuador received nearly $30.9
million in ACI funding, consisting of $15 million for interdiction
and law enforcement programs, and $15.9 million for alternative
development.  In addition, Ecuador received $1 million in Foreign
Military Financing.
! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $35 million in
ACI funding, consisting of  $20 million for interdiction and law
enforcement, and $15 million for alternative development.  For
Foreign Military Financing, the Administration estimates spending
$7 million.
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $26 million in ACI
funding, consisting of $11 million for interdiction and law
enforcement, and $15 million for alternative development.  The
request also included $2 million in Foreign Military Financing.
Congress approved $26 million for ACI and $1 million for FMF.
Brazil
Brazil’s isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms
Colombia’s southeastern border. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers
Party was inaugurated as President on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the
second round presidential election in October 2002, with support from a wide range
of parties.
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Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but it is a conduit for the
transit of coca paste and cocaine from Colombia to Europe and the United States.
With increasing drug use within the country, a major action in 2002 was the passage
of an omnibus Brazilian federal counter-narcotics law.  Brazilians have long been
concerned about the sparsely populated territory in the huge Amazon region, and they
have been fearful historically of foreign designs and intervention in this territory.  In
an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4
billion sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM
from its acronym in Portuguese, and it has offered to share data from this system with
neighbors and the United States.  It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with
25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air force and navy support.  In 2000, it  launched
COBRA, an inter-agency border security program  to deal with spillover effects from
Colombia.  In 2003, Brazil expanded COBRA to its northern borders with Peru,
Venezuela, and Bolivia.  The program focuses on controlling land and air entry into
Brazil and is headquartered at Tabatinga.
Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging
indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to
Colombian traffickers, and FARC incursions along the border.18  In late June 2003,
Brazil announced that it would increase the number of troops in states that share a
border with Colombia.  Brazil has not agreed to exempt U.S. citizens from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and in July 2003 it became subject
to sanctions that could result in the loss of $500,000 in IMET military education and
training funds in FY2004.
Funding and Request for Brazil.
! Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,
but under  ACI allocations for FY2002 Brazil received $6 million in
ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcement funding. 
! Under the FY2003 ACI allocation, Brazil received $6 million, nearly
all in law enforcement funding.
! In FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $10.2 million in
ACI funding, nearly all in law enforcement funding. 
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $9 million in ACI
funding, nearly all for law enforcement activities.  Congress
approved the $9 million request.
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Venezuela19
Venezuela, Colombia’s eastern neighbor, is a major transit route for cocaine and
heroin destined for the United States and Europe.  It shares a 1,370 mile border with
Colombia of rugged and poorly controlled territory.  There has been increasing
concern about the guerrilla conflict in Colombia spreading to Venezuela.  At times,
Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries have entered Venezuela territory causing
frictions in Colombian-Venezuelan relations.  Late in 2003, Venezuelan officials
accused paramilitary forces of killing seven of its National Guard soldiers.
Colombian paramilitaries have also been implicated in the creation of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Venezuela (AUV), a newly formed paramilitary
organization.20  Opponents of President Hugo Chavez regularly accuse him of
harboring FARC guerrillas, but these accusations have not been substantiated.  A
controversial press report claims that there are as many as ten FARC camps in
Venezuela.21  The FARC has issued communiques in support of President Chavez’s
Bolivarian revolution, leading some analysts and Chavez opponents to believe that
the Venezuelan government is turning a blind eye to the presence of guerrilla
camps.22
There is some coca cultivation in Venezuela and the government has conducted
some eradication efforts.  In 2001, some coca fields were located and eradicated, and
processing labs were detected and destroyed.  There were no eradication efforts in
2002, but both eradication and seizures took place in 2003.  Despite various policy
disagreements with the United States, Venezuela has cooperated with the United
States in counternarcotics efforts.  The country is presently led by President Hugo
Chavez, a  populist and leader of an unsuccessful military coup in the early 1990s,
who was initially elected in 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the constitution, rid the
country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the people. Under
President Chavez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new
constitution and revamped political institutions.
Under the Chavez government, there has been friction at times in U.S.-
Venezuelan relations, and Chavez has at times used anti-U.S. rhetoric. He denounced
Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy, and denied the United States
overflight rights over Venezuela territory for drug interdiction.  Venezuelan officials
have refused to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, and in July 2003, the country became subject to sanctions that led
to the loss of $700,000 in Military Education and Training funds in FY2004 and
could lead to the loss of $50,000 in FY2005.  The Senate Foreign Operations Bill for
FY2004 (S. 1426/S.Rept. 108-106) contained a provision that would have denied
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Venezuela assistance if the Secretary of State certifies that Venezuela is assisting,
harboring, or providing sanctuary to Colombian terrorist organizations.  In the
conference report accompanying P.L. 108-199, this provision was changed to a
reporting requirement on Venezuela’s alleged support for these groups.
Funding and Request for Venezuela.
! While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under the final ACI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela
received $5 million, consisting of law enforcement and
administration of justice programs.
! Under FY2003 ACI allocations, Venezuela received $2.1 million in
ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of
justice programs.
! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $5 million in
ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of
justice programs.
! For FY2005, the Administration requested $3 million in ACI
funding.  Congress approved the $3 million request.
Panama23
Panama, a part of Colombia until 1903, is separated from Colombia along its
southern border by the difficult and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain
forest of the “Darien Gap.” Panama’s history has been heavily influenced by its
strategic location and the transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center
of the country, where the major cities are located.  Despite considerable effort in the
period leading up to the U.S. withdrawal from the Canal, Panama and the United
States were not able to complete negotiations to retain a formal U.S. military
presence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes.  This led the United
States to develop the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in El Salvador,
Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities.  U.S.-Panama
relations have been very friendly, however, and Panama did agree to exempt U.S.
citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court shortly before
President Moscoso’s late June 2003 official visit to Washington, D.C. 
Panama is not a drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment point
for cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a major site for money-
laundering activity.  In recent years, Panama has cooperated with the United States
in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant amounts of illicit drugs and
enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering legislation. The two countries
signed a maritime interdiction agreement in 2002.  In January 2004, Panama
extradited an alleged Colombian drug lord to the United States for prosecution on
drug charges.  The State Department reports that Panama seized increased amounts
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of drugs in 2003, including significant amounts of heroin.24  Panama’s border with
Colombia has been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and
paramilitary groups.  There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being
founded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception
that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected.  Shipments of
small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as
well. In April 2003, Panama and Colombia signed a border security agreement to
strengthen security and prevent incursions by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary
forces.
Funding and Request for Panama.
 ! While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under  allocations for FY2002, Panama received $5
million in ACI funding, consisting  largely of border control and law
enforcement funds. 
 ! For FY2003, Panama received $4.5 million in ACI funds, consisting
largely of border control and law enforcement funds.  In addition,
Panama received $1 million in Foreign Military Financing.
 ! For FY2004, the Administration estimates spending $6.5 million in
ACI funds, consisting largely of border control and law enforcement
funds.  In addition, the Administration estimates spending $2 million
in Foreign Military Financing.
 ! For FY2005, the Administration requested $6 million in ACI
funding, consisting largely of border control and law enforcement
activities.  The request also included $1.5 million in Foreign Military
Financing.  Congress approved $3 million for ACI and $1 million
for FMF.
Major Legislative Activity in the 108th Congress on
Andean Counterdrug Initiative Issues
Legislative Activity in 2004
FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations.  On July 15, 2004, the
House passed H.R. 4818 (H.Rept. 108-599) that fully funds the ACI at $731 million.
However, the report stated the committee’s expectation that ACI funding would
begin to decrease in FY2006 in light of the six-year Plan Colombia coming to an end.
The bill maintained many of the provisions from previous law. (See section on
“Congressional Conditions on U.S. Assistance.”) These provisions included authority
for a unified campaign, conditioned on the Colombian military’s respect for human
rights.  The bill also maintained the prohibition on combat operations by U.S.
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military and civilian personnel, and  reporting and certification requirements with
regard to human rights.  The bill also maintained the requirement for 30-day advance
notification before resuming the Air Bridge Denial Program in Peru, and it
maintained the requirement that helicopters procured with U.S. funds be returned if
they are used for illegal activities.  The report directed that $5 million be provided
to support programs benefitting internally displaced persons in Colombia and states
the Committee’s support for USAID alternative development programs in Colombia.
With regard to Peru, the committee expressed concern that alternative development
funding is inadequate, with too much of a focus on forced eradication.  Similarly, the
committee stated its concern that alternative development programs in coca-growing
regions of Bolivia should have local participation and financial support from the
Bolivian government.  The report also encouraged the Secretary of State to negotiate
with European allies for larger contributions to counternarcotic, alternative
development, and judicial reform programs in the Andean region.  
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2812 (S.Rept. 108-346) on
September 15, 2004.  On September 23, 2004, the Senate passed H.R. 4818,
substituting the language of S. 2812.  The bill provided $731 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative; $272 million directed for alternative development and
institution building programs.  Of the $272 million, $240 million was apportioned
to  USAID, including $140 million for Colombia.  The bill stated that “responsibility
for policy decisions for the use of such funds, including what activities will be funded
and the amount of funds that will be provided for each of these activities, shall be the
responsibility of the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development in consultation with the Assistance Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.”  The bill directed that not less than $6
million be available for judicial reform programs in Colombia, that not less than $6
million be made available for programs to protect human rights, and that not less than
$2 million be made available for programs to protect biodiversity and indigenous
reserves in Colombia.  The bill provided authority to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities, as provided in previous
legislation.  This authority shall end if the Secretary of State has credible evidence
that the Colombian military is not conducting vigorous operations to restore
government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the control of
illegally armed groups.
The Senate also included a number of reporting requirements similar to previous
years.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, is
required to submit a report not later than 45 days after enactment on the proposed
uses of all funds on a country-by-country basis.  The Secretary of State must also
certify to Congress that the herbicide mixture used in aerial fumigation programs is
being used in accordance with EPA requirements for comparable use in the United
States and with Colombian law, and that the herbicide mixture does not pose
unreasonable risks to humans or the environment.  This certification must be
provided in order to release 20% of the funds used for the procurement of chemicals.
The remaining 80% may be spent without a certification.
The bill required that no funds may be made available for aerial fumigation
unless the Secretary of State certifies that complaints of harm to health or licit crops
caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is being paid for
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meritorious claims.  In addition, the bill required that these funds may not be spent
unless programs are being implement by USAID, the government of Colombia, or
other organizations, in consultation with local communities, to provide alternative
sources of income in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers of illicit
crops.  The Secretary of State is also required to certify that the aerial fumigation in
Colombia’s national parks or reserves is in accordance with Colombian laws and that
there are no effective alternatives to reduce illicit cultivation in these areas.
The bill continued a prohibition on any U.S. military or civilian contract
personnel from participating in any combat operations.  Similarly, if any helicopters
procured with funds provided in the bill are used to aid or abet the operations of any
self-defense group, the helicopters must be returned to the United States.  With
regard to the AUC demobilization process in Colombia, the bill provided that funds
may be made available to support the process only if the Secretary of State certifies
that 1) the Colombian legal framework governing the process provides for
prosecution and punishment in proportion to the crimes committed, of those
responsible for gross violations of human rights and drug trafficking; 2) the
Colombian government is taking actions to ensure the dismantling of the underlying
structures fo such groups; 3)  the Colombian government is taking actions to enable
the return of civilians forcibly displaced by such groups, and 4) the United States may
continue to extradite Colombian citizens in accordance with existing extradition
treaties.
The bill maintained current law with regard to the Secretary of State certifying
that the Colombian government is taking actions to respect human rights and to
prosecute violations.  It also continued the general prohibition on U.S. assistance to
any units of security forces that are credibly alleged to have committed gross
violations of human rights.  Further, it prohibited the issuance of visas to any alien
suspected of providing support to any of Colombia’s illegally armed groups.
Assistance to the Bolivian military and police forces was conditioned on their
respect for human rights and cooperation with civilian judicial authorities, and the
Bolivian government’s efforts to prosecute and punish those responsible for
violations of human rights.
Foreign Operations Conference Report.   H.R. 4818, the FY2005 Foreign
Operations Act, became the base bill for the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
FY2005, that was passed by both the House and Senate on November 20, 2004
(H.Rept. 108-792).  The conference agreement provides $731 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative and specifies that $264.6 million of this amount is for
alternative development and institution-building programs.  It further directs that of
the amounts for alternative development and institution-building programs, USAID
is to receive $237 million, including $125.7 million for programs in Colombia.  The
agreement includes a 0.83% rescission for FY2005 appropriations.
The conference report maintains current law with regard to support for a unified
campaign, the use of U.S. funded helicopters, and prohibiting U.S. personnel from
combat.  It continues to condition funding on a certification on human rights from the
Secretary of State, and funding for aerial fumigation on a certification from the
Secretary of State.  As in FY2004, it requires that funds for aerial fumigation cannot
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be spent unless programs are being implemented to provide alternative sources of
income for growers.  It maintains the Leahy amendment on security forces and
prohibits visas to anyone suspected of aiding Colombia’s illegally armed groups.  It
also requires a 30-day notification before resuming an Air Bridge Denial program in
Peru.  The Secretary of State is required to submit a report on the proposed use of
funds on a country-by-country basis.  It allows assistance to the Bolivian military and
police only if they are respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations
and prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights.  It also earmarks not less than
$6 million for judicial reform programs in Colombia, not less than $6 million for
programs to protect human rights, and not less than $2 million for programs to
protect biodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia.
With regard to the demobilization process in Colombia, the conference report
removes a Senate provision on assistance to support the demobilization of illegal
armed groups.  The conference agreement requires congressional consultation and
notification prior to USAID obligating any funds for peace initiatives in Colombia.
The agreement also expresses concern that the demobilization process is not ensuring
the dismantling of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) or deterring members from
resuming illegal activities and that the government of Colombia is not prosecuting
those involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations.  It recommends that
the State Department not request FY2006 funds for demobilization unless the
Department of Justice determines the activities are consistent with U.S. anti-terrorism
laws, and that 
1) the FTO is respecting a ceasefire and cessation of illegal activities; 
2) the Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its
obligations under the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and has committed to the
U.S. that it will continue to extradite Colombians, including members of illegally
armed groups; 
3) the Colombian legal framework governing demobilization provides for
prosecution and punishment in proportion to the crimes committed of those
responsible for gross violations of human rights, violations of international
humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, for reparations to victims, and for monitoring
of demobilized individuals; 
4)  the Colombian government is implementing a policy of dismantling such groups,
including seizure of financial and property assets; and 
5) the Colombian government is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets,
including real property, to their original owners.
It also requests that before any U.S. funds are provided to the OAS Mission in
Colombia for demobilization purposes, the Secretary of State report to the
Committees on Appropriations that the OAS Mission is strictly adhering to its
verification role, FTOs are concentrated in demobilization zones, the legal
framework governing demobilization conforms with (3) above, and the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights is providing advice to the OAS Mission.
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FY2005 National Defense Authorization.  Both the House and Senate
passed defense authorizations acts with provisions relating to the Andean region
(H.R. 4200/S. 2400).  Both acts provided continuing authority for a unified campaign
against drug trafficking and related terrorist activities, as well as maintaining a
prohibition on U.S. personnel engaging in combat operations.  The Senate act
approved the Administration’s request to raise the cap on U.S. military personnel
allowed to be stationed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia from 400 to 800
and the cap on U.S. civilian personnel from 400 to 600.  The House version raised
the cap on U.S. military personnel to 500.  The Senate act included a provision
requiring a report from the Secretary of State within 60 days of enactment (in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence)
on any relationships between foreign governments or organizations with
organizations in Colombia that have been designated foreign terrorist organizations
by the United States.  Currently, this would apply to the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  The report must describe what direct or indirect
assistance these groups are receiving and the U.S. policies designed to address such
relationships.  Finally, the report (S.Rept. 108-260) recognized the progress made by
the Uribe Administration and the Colombian Armed Forces in combating narco-
terrorist groups. 
The conference report (H.Rept. 108-767) maintained language authorizing a
unified campaign against drug trafficking and terrorism for FY2005 and FY2006.
It raise the cap on military personnel allowed to be deployed in support of Plan
Colombia from 400 to 800, and the civilian cap from 400 to 600.  It maintained a
prohibition on U.S. personnel participating in combat operations.  It also kept the
Senate provision calling for a report on the relationship between foreign governments
or foreign organizations and the Colombian organizations that have been designated
foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department. 
FY2005 Foreign Affairs Authorization.25  On February 27, 2004, Senator
Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced
S.2144, the FY2005 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act.  The bill authorized
appropriations for the Department of State, the Peace Corps, and foreign assistance
programs.  The bill was reported out of committee on March 4, 2004; no further
action was taken before the end of the 108th Congress.  With regard to the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, the bill authorized $731 million in FY2005, the same as the
President’s request.  It maintained current law allowing funds to be used to support
a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities.  It also
maintained the current cap on U.S. military and U.S. contractor personnel at 400
each, and prohibits their participation in combat operations.  It also maintained
conditions on U.S. assistance pending certification from the Secretary of State with
regard to Colombia’s human rights practices.  These provisions were also contained
in S. 925, the FY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, and S. 1161, the FY2004
Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, neither of which were enacted.
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H.Res. 535.  Introduced on February 25, 2004 by Representative Jerry Weller,
H.Res. 535 expresses concern and support for local elected officials under threat of
assassination, kidnapping, forcible displacement, and coercion by terrorist
organizations operating in Colombia.  The bill was referred to the House
International Relations Committee.
Pending Legislation from 2003
FY2004 Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization.  The
House passed H.R. 2086, to reauthorize the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
on September 30, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-167, Part 1 and 2).  The act would require a
South American Heroin Strategy Report to be submitted to Congress within 90 days
of enactment on a strategy to fight the increased threat of heroin from the Andean
region.  S. 1860 was introduced in the Senate on November 14, 2003 and referred to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.  The bill included a provision on a Latin
American Heroin Strategy Report similar to the House bill.
FY2004 and FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization.  The House
approved H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2004 on July
16, 2003.  The act included language requiring the Secretary of State to certify
Colombia’s compliance with accepted human rights practices.  It also would require
a report of the impact of U.S. assistance in support of Plan Colombia on Colombia’s
neighbors.  Language is also included which would extend U.S. counterdrug
assistance for  interdiction to arms trafficking.  It would also require the Secretary of
State to ensure, not  later than 180 days after enactment, that pilots of the opium
poppy aerial eradication program be Colombian nationals, with preference given to
members of the Colombian National Police.  
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 925 (S.Rept. 108-39),
on April 24, 2003 with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region.
Section 801 would repeal the requirement in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriation Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-246) that the State Department report semi-
annually on the extradition of narcotics traffickers from Andean countries.  During
floor consideration in July 2003, two amendments relating to Colombia were
approved by voice vote.  Amendment 1194 added Section 2522 commending the
leadership and people of Colombia for progress made against drug traffickers and
terrorists.  Amendment 1162 added Section 815 changing the frequency of reports
on U.S. personnel deployed in Colombia from bimonthly to quarterly.  The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee also reported out S. 1161, the FY2004 Foreign
Assistance Authorization Act (S.Rept. 108-56) on June 10, 2003.  The bill would
authorize the ACI at $700 million (rather than the $731 million requested by the
Administration.)  It maintains language supporting a unified campaign against drug
trafficking and terrorist organizations, and personnel caps on U.S. military and
civilian contractors at 400 each.  It would prohibit any U.S. personnel from
participating in combat operations.  It would also maintain reporting requirements on
human rights practices in Colombia.
Temporary Protected Status.  Several bills were introduced to designate
Colombian and Peruvian citizens under section 244 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as eligible for temporary protected status (TPS).  H.R. 2843,
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introduced on July 24, 2003, would grant TPS to both Colombians and Peruvians.
H.R. 2853, introduced the same day, would grant TPS to just Colombians.  Both bills
were referred to the House Judiciary Committee.  In the Senate, S. 986 would
designate Colombians as eligible for TPS.  The bill was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.26
Enacted Legislation from 2003
FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations.  The House and Senate
Foreign Operations Appropriations bills were included in the FY2004 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2673).  The measure passed the House on December 8,
2003 and the Senate on January 22, 2004 (P.L. 108-199 Division D).  The conference
report (H.Rept. 108-401) provides $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative, the same as the President’s request.  It also provides a total of $4.294
billion in Foreign Military Financing, of which the Administration estimates
spending $124.1 million in the Andean region.  The enacted legislation maintains
current law with regard to support for a unified campaign against drug trafficking and
terrorist organizations.  It keeps the caps on U.S. military and civilian contractor
personnel at 400 each, and prohibits them from participating in combat operations.
It also maintains language barring the use of ACI-procured helicopters if they are
used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense group.  It continues to
require a report on the use of ACI funds on a country-by-country basis.  It requires
a certification on human rights practices in Colombia in order to release 25% of ACI
funding.  It allows for the immediate release of 80% of funds for aerial fumigation.
To release the remaining 20% requires certification from the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, on the
health and environmental effects of the herbicide mixture used in spraying
operations.  The law also designates that $25 million be made available for justice
and law programs in Colombia, and that an additional $13 million be made available
for organizations and programs that protect human rights.  It allows fumigation
operations in Colombia’s National Park Service if the Secretary of State determines
that it is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective
alternatives.
FY2004 Department of Defense Authorization.  The House and Senate
passed the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act in November 2003 (H.R. 1588/S.
1050).  It was signed into law on November 24, 2003 (P.L. 108-136).  With regard
to counternarcotics, Section 1021 provides authority for the Department of Defense
to provide support for counterdrug activities by extending authority in Section 1033
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 (P.L. 105-84) for counterdrug
support to Colombia and Peru.  Section 1022 authorizes the Department of Defense
joint task forces to provide for counterterrorism activities to law enforcement
agencies, as it does for counterdrug activities.  Section 1023 extends for an additional
two years expanded authority to use Defense Department counterdrug funds to
support a unified campaign against narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and against
associated terrorist organizations in Colombia.
CRS-30
FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act.  The House and Senate passed the
FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act in November 2003 (H.R. 2417/S. 1025).  It
was signed into law on December 13, 2003 (P.L. 108-177).  Section 502 authorizes
the use of intelligence funds for a unified campaign against drug trafficking and
terrorism in Colombia.  It also maintains the prohibition on U.S. military or civilian
contractors from participating in combat operations in Colombia.
CRS-31
Figure 1.  Andean Counterdrug Initiative Countries
Appendix A.  Map
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Appendix B.  FY2003 Allocations
Table 1.  FY2003 Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
and Related Programs; 













ACIa DA CSH ESF FMF
Colombia 636.3 149.2 377.0 580.2b 0 0 0 110.1
Bolivia 133.4  41.7  49.0  90.7 12.1 18.6 10.0   2.0
Brazil  24.3 0  6.0   6.0  8.0 10.3 0 0
Ecuador  53.5  15.9 15.0  30.9  7.1 0 14.5   1.0
Panama  14.0 0  4.5  4.5  5.5 0  3.0   1.0
Peru 173.4 68.6 59.5 128.1 16.4 19.9 8.0   1.0
Venezuela   2.6 0  2.1   2.1 0 0  .5 0
Totals 1,037.5 275.4 513.1 842.5 49.1 48.8 36.0 115.1
Source: Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2004, Fiscal Year
2005, U.S. Department of State.  Prepared by CRS, March 29, 2004.
a.  ACI is managed by the State Department’s Bureau on International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement.
b.  Includes supplemental funding of $54 million:  $34 million for ACI and $20 million from FMF,
which could be transferred to ACI.  In addition, the Administration used $17.1 million in FMF
for programs in Colombia.
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Appendix C.  FY2004  Estimates
Table 2.  FY2004 Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
and Related Programs;













ACIa DA CSH ESF FMF
Colombia 572.4 150.0 313.0 463.0 0 0 0 109.4
Bolivia 130.0  42.0  49.0  91.0 11.4 14.4 8.0   4.0
Brazil   28.0 0 10.2  10.2  8.2  12.0 0 0
Ecuador  61.7 15.0 20.0  35.0  7.1 .3 12.9   7.0
Panama  16.8 0 6.5 6.5 5.8 0  3.0   2.0
Peru 158.9 50.0 66.0 116.0 15.3 16.7 8.0   1.7
Venezuela   5.5 0  5.0   5.0 0 0   .5 0
Totals 972.7 257.0 469.7 726.7 47.8 43.4 32.4 124.1
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2005, U.S. Department
of State.  Prepared by CRS, March 29, 2004.
a.  ACI is managed by the State Department’s Bureau on International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement.
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Appendix D.  FY2005  Request
Table 3.  FY2005 Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
and Related Programs;













ACIa DA CSH ESF FMF
Colombia 571.0 150.0 313.0 463.0 0 0 0 108.0
Bolivia 132.6  42.0  49.0  91.0 14.5 16.1 8.0   3.0
Brazil  23.6 0   9.0   9.0  7.0  7.6 0 0
Ecuador  48.4  15.0  11.0  26.0  7.0   .4 13.0   2.0
Panama  15.9 0   6.0   6.0  5.4 0  3.0   1.5
Peru 144.5  50.0  62.0 112.0 10.5 13.0  8.0   1.0
Venezuela   3.5 0   3.0   3.0 0 0   .5 0
Totals 939.5 257.0 453.0 710.0b 44.4 37.1 32.5 115.5
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, U.S. Department
of State.  Prepared by CRS, March 29, 2004.
a.  ACI is managed by the State Department’s Bureau on International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement.
b.  Total for ACI does not include $21 million for the Air Bridge Denial Program.
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Appendix E. FY2005 Appropriations
Table 4.  FY2005 Andean Counterdrug Initiative















Colombia 566.5 153.3 313.2 466.5 100.0
Bolivia 101.0 42.0 49.0 91.0 8.0 2.0
Brazil 9.0 9.0 9.0
Ecuador 40.0 15.0 11.0 26.0 13.0 1.0
Panama 10.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 1.0
Peru 125.3 54.3 62.0 116.3 8.0 1.0
Venezuela   3.5 0   3.0   3.0   .5 0
Nicaraguaa 5.0 1.0 1.0 3.5 0.5
Honduras 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Totals 862.3 264.6 455.2 719.8b 36.0 106.5
a.  H.R. 4818 provided $1 million each for Nicaragua and Honduras, two Central American countries
that have not received ACI funding in previous year.
b. Total for ACI does not include $11.2 million for the Air Bridge Denial Program.
CRS-36
Appendix F.  FY2000 - FY2005 Funding
Table 5.  FY2000 to FY2005 ACI and DOD Funding
($ millions)
Year ACI - Region DOD ACI -Colombia
FMF -
Colombia
FY2000 1,174.8 429.1a   832.0 0
FY2001   154.8 190.2   48.0 0
FY2002   645.0 119.1   373.9   6.0
FY2003   788.0 165.0   580.2 110.1
FY2004   726.7 122.0   463.0 109.4
FY2005 731.0 200.0b 466.5 100.0
Total 4,220.3 1,225.4 2,763.6 325.5
Source: Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations FY2003, FY2004, FY2005, U.S.
Department of State.  Prepared by CRS, March 29, 2004.
a.  Includes $300.60 provided in P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia legislation for counterdrug activities
in the Andean region.  Figures for FY2001-FY2004 are for Colombia alone. Amount for
FY2003 includes supplemental funding of $34 million.
b.  DOD estimate.
